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Abstract 
While there appears to be deep and growing concern for the brain drain from Africa, lack of adequate data 
has so far prevented a comprehensive analysis of its magnitude and its impact on source countries. Using 
original datasets on international migration, this paper addresses both issues. We show that many African 
economies lost a consistent part of their highly skilled labor force due to migration to developed countries. 
We also highlight that significant effort is still needed, in terms of data collection and empirical analysis, 
before drawing clear conclusions on the effects of the brain drain on Africa. 
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1- Introduction 
According to the latest figures, a high percentage of highly educated African migrate oversees. For 
example, between 1990 and 2000, the stock of high-skilled immigrants from African countries residing in 
the OECD countries increased by 90% (Table 1). As a consequence, a number of African countries ''lost'' a 
significant proportion of their highly educated labor force. 
The figures reveal that a considerable “brain drain” from Africa is at place, a phenomenon that is likely to 
worsen the already worrying situation of the African continent in terms of human capital as shown by the 
most recent indicators on literacy rates and research and development.
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While there appears to be deep and growing concern for the brain drain from Africa, lack of adequate data 
has so far prevented a comprehensive analysis of its magnitude and its impact on source countries. Using 
original datasets on international migration, this paper addresses both issues. After giving an overall 
picture of the magnitude of the brain-drain from Africa, we will concentrate on two related issues that 
have so far received little attention: female brain drain and the brain drain in the medical profession.  
Female brain drain may translate into a higher loss than male brain drain, particularly in contexts such as 
Africa, where female literacy rates are still very low and female human capital constitutes a more scarce 
resource than male human capital: a vast body of literature has indeed pointed out that women’s education 
is a fundamental element for growth and development (see, for example, World Bank, 2007). The second 
aforementioned issue, i.e. the brain drain within the medical profession represents a serious problem for 
the African continent, as it may be linked to a worsening of the health situation of its population and of its 
health system as a whole.  
In our discussion on female and medical brain drain from Africa we will report the results of existing 
studies and comment on the available data on the topic, but we will also highlight that more effort is still 
needed in order to reach conclusive results on both phenomena. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide an overall picture of the brain 
drain from Africa, including female brain drain and the case of medical brain drain. In Section 3 we 
describe existing evidence on the impact of brain drain on source countries. Section 4 discusses a few 
relevant issues that, in our opinion, deserve the attention of scientific research. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
                                                          
1 38% of the adult population in Africa is illiterate, and the participation rate in tertiary education is only 6%, which is the lowest in the world, in 
comparison to a global average of 26% (see UNESCO, 2010). Moreover, the continent accounts for only 2.2% of the total number of Research 
and Development (R&D) researchers in the world and 1.5% of the world’s physicians (see WHO 2009). 
2- Magnitude of high-skilled migration from Africa  
The purpose of the present and the following sections is to illustrate how large high-skilled migration from 
Africa is. Our analysis is based on the international migration data-set developed by Docquier, Lowell and 
Marfouk (2007, 2009) - DLM07
2
 henceforth - which provides detailed information on international 
migration by sex, educational attainment, countries of origin and destination – in absolute terms and in 
percentage of the total labour force born in the sending country (emigration rates).  
DLM07 relies on harmonised census and register data on the structure of immigration in 30 OECD 
member states with the highest level of detail on the country of birth for two periods (1990 and 2000). 
Three levels of schooling are distinguished: primary (low-skilled: including lower-secondary, primary and 
no school), secondary (medium-skilled: high school leaving certificate or equivalent), and tertiary 
education (high-skilled: higher than high-school leaving certificate or equivalent). Brain drain is defined 
as the migration of tertiary educated workers.  
DLM07 counts as migrants all working-age (25+) foreign-born individuals living in an OECD country. 
Considering the population aged 25+ maximises the comparability of the immigration population with 
data on educational attainment in the source countries. It also excludes a large number of students who 
temporarily emigrate to complete their education.  
Let      
  indicate the stock of adults aged 25+ born in country i and residing in country j with skill level 
s at time t. Aggregating these numbers over the destination countries j gives the stock of emigrants from 
source country i living in the OCED area: 
         
         
 
 
 
Skilled emigration rates are obtained by comparing the emigration stocks to the total number of people 
born in the source country and belonging to the same educational category. Calculating the brain drain as a 
proportion of the total educated labour force is more appropriate to evaluate the pressure imposed on the 
local labour market. For example, one may argue that the pressure exerted on the national economy by 
151,451 Egyptian high-skilled emigrants (4.7 % of the educated total labour force) is less than the pressure 
exerted by 7,558 high-skilled emigrants from Cape Verde (82.4 % of the national educated labour force). 
Let     
  be the total resident population in the country of origin i at time t. The emigration rate from 
country i to country j at time t is: 
                                                          
2 DLM07 is an extension of the Data set developed by Docquier and Marfouk (2004, 2006) which provides information on the structure of 
immigration in the OECD area by origin and destination countries and educational level but without gender breakdown. 
  
Table 1 describes the structure of migration to OECD countries by educational attainment and region of 
origin. It shows that a significant proportion of African immigrants are highly educated. In 2000, 
approximately one out of every three African migrants (32%) is tertiary educated, compared to 26% for 
the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) and 22% for Europe. The same Table reveals that the 
percentage of highly skilled among African migrants has increased by 7 percentage points over the period 
1990-2000
3
, against -1 percentage point for the LAC region, and 4 percentage points for the migrants in 
developing countries considered as a whole.  
Comparing the educational level of migrants with the one of the overall population in the home countries 
reveals that, in general, migrants are better educated than those left behind. This is particularly true in 
Africa, where, as Table 1 shows, the proportion of the tertiary educated among migrants from Africa (32% 
in 2000) is eight times higher than their proportion in the continent labor force (4%). In the last two 
columns of Table 1 we have computed the high-skilled (brain drain) and low-skilled emigration rates. 
Looking at the value of the brain drain rate for the African region in 2000, it is remarkable how the 
propensity to move among highly-skilled workers (10.6%)
4
 is approximately twelve times higher than 
among the low-skilled (0.9%). This clearly indicates that the African continent is losing a consistent part 
of its human capital endowment.  
To further explore this issue in Table 2 we display the situation of the most affected African countries. 
The brain drain intensity is different when measured in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms, 
unsurprisingly, the largest countries are more strongly affected by the exodus of highly skilled workers. 
The top eight sending countries in 2000 were South Africa (173,411), Morocco (155,994), Egypt 
(151,451), Nigeria (148,780), Algeria (87,777), Kenya (80,287), and Ghana (67,105). However, when the 
brain drain is measured as a proportion of the national highly skilled labor force, small countries suffer 
from a massive brain drain. This is the highest in Cape Verde (82%), Seychelles (77%), Gambia (68%), 
and Mauritius (56%).  
                                                          
3 Looking at specific regions of origin (Table 2), this proportion is particularly high in countries such Nigeria (65%), South Africa (63%), and 
Egypt (59%).  
4 The African countries’ unweighted average of high-skilled emigration rates is much higher (20%).  
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Table 1- Descriptive statistics by region of origin (1990-2000) 
 Structure of immigration  
(in thousands) 
Proportion of high-skilled  
(in %) 
Emigration rates  
(in %) 
Region of origin Total Low- skilled High-skilled Among 
Immigrants 
In region of origin 
labour force 
Low-skilled High-Skilled 
  2000 
All countries 58,619 25,280 20,523 35 11.1 1.3 5.5 
Developed countries  19,890 7,047 7,940 40 29.8 3.6 3.9 
Developing countries 37,890 17,395 12,391 33 6.2 1.0 7.3 
From Selected region        
Africa 4,465 2,188 1,407 32 3.9 0.9 10.6 
Asia 15,255 5,468 7,014 46 6.0 0.4 5.8 
Europe 21,364 9,026 6,896 32 17.7 4.4 7.3 
Latin America and Caribbean 13,966 7,319 3,684 26 11.8 4.1 11.1 
        
  1990 
All countries 41,996 20,601 12,546 30 9.1 1.3 5.1 
Developed countries  18,206 8,099 5,768 32 23.7 3.9 4.0 
Developing countries 22,605 11,830 6,513 29 4.7 0.9 6.5 
From Selected region        
Africa 2,914 1,760 .742 25 2.5 0.9 11.5 
Asia 9,435 3,979 3,786 40 4.7 0.4 5.2 
Europe 19,492 9,906 4,890 25 13.8 5.0 7.0 
Latin America and Caribbean 7,019 3,745 1,926 27 8.9 2.6 10.1 
Note: Migrants are defined as persons aged 25 or older. Low-skilled = persons with less than secondary diploma, high-skilled= persons with tertiary diploma. “Total” corresponds to 
the sum of low-skilled, medium and high-skilled migrants. “All countries” refers to the sum of migrants from developed countries, developing countries, dependent territories and 
migrants who did not report their country of birth. Developing and developed country- groups are based on the World Bank income classification. 
Source: Authors’ computations based DLM dataset (2009). 
Table 2 - Emigration (25 years and over) form African to OECD countries, by country of origin. 
Top25 ranked in decreasing order, year 2000 
Country of 
origin 
High-skilled   
(in thousands) 
Country of 
origin 
High-skilled emigration 
rate in (%) 
South Africa 173,411 Cape Verde 82% 
Morocco 155,994 Seychelles 77% 
Egypt 151,451 Gambia 68% 
Nigeria 148,780 Mauritius 56% 
Algeria 87,777 Sierra Leone 49% 
Kenya 80,287 Ghana 45% 
Ghana 67,105 Liberia 44% 
Ethiopia 52,538 Kenya 39% 
Tunisia 40,226 Uganda 36% 
Congo Dem. Rep. 38,017 Eritrea 35% 
Uganda 35,921 Somalia 35% 
Zimbabwe 34,017 Rwanda 32% 
Tanzania 33,125 Congo Rep.  28% 
Somalia 26,758 Guinea-Bissau 28% 
Mauritius 23,185 Sao Tome and Principe 27% 
Cameroon 22,148 Mozambique 23% 
Congo Rep  20,426 Comoros 21% 
Liberia 20,347 Equatorial Guinea 21% 
Sudan 18,341 Malawi 21% 
Sierra Leone 16,647 Morocco 19% 
Senegal 15,844 Cameroon 17% 
Zambia 14,019 Senegal 17% 
Cote d'Ivoire 13,674 Togo 17% 
Eritrea 12,939 Zambia 16% 
Madagascar 12,506 Congo demo. Rep. 15% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on DLM dataset (2009). 
2.1- Female migration: A hidden dimension of the African brain drain 
Available data show that the female component of both the worldwide and African brain drain is growing 
over time. In Table 3 we have computed the stock of migrants for 1990 and 2000 by gender, country of 
origin, and educational level, based on the DLM07. It is evident from this table that, on average, 50.9% of 
international migrants from around the world are women. Moreover, the share of women among highly 
skilled migrants is also considerable: women comprise 40.9% of the total highly skilled migrants 
worldwide and 40.6% of highly skilled migrants from Africa. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of highly skilled female migrants from all over the world increased 
by 73%, from 5.8 to about 10.1 million (see Table 3). The growth of the low-skilled female migration rate 
in the same period was much lower (+22%). For Africa, the number of low and high-skilled female 
migrants increased by 33% and 113% respectively. In all regions, the growth rate of the stock of highly 
skilled female migrants was consistently greater than the growth rate of highly skilled male migrants.  
Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) point out that this increase in female brain drain is a consequence 
of the increased female educational attainment on the one hand, and of the higher demand for women’s 
labor in the health care sector and other services on the other hand. Moreover, cultural and social changes 
in the attitude towards female migration in many source countries may have also played a role. To 
complete the picture, in Figure 1 we compare men and women’s emigration rates by educational level and 
region of origin in 2000. In general, skilled women represent the most mobile component of international 
migrants. This is the case in Africa where both the low (0.8%) and high-skilled (13.4%) female emigration 
rates are respectively lower and higher than the male emigration rates (1.1 and 9.3%)5. 
Figure 1 – Men and women emigration rates by education level and origin, situation in 2000 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on DLM dataset (2009) 
                                                          
5 The gender gap in skilled emigration is more important for Sub-Saharan Africa (6.2 percentage points). 
Table 3- Descriptive statistics by country groups, sex and education level (1990-2000) 
 Total immigration Low-skilled High-skilled 
Region of origin Men Women Share of women   
 (in %) 
Men Women Share of women  
(in %) 
Men Women Share of women  
(in %) 
 2000 
All countries 28,785 29,834 50.9 12,332 12,948 51.2 10,413 10,110 49.3 
Developed countries 9,361 10,529 52.9 3,253 3,795 53.8 3,947 3,993 50.3 
Developing countries 18,808 18,680 49,8 8,675 8,720 50.1 6,363 6,028 48.6 
From Selected regions          
Africa 2,494 1,970 44.1 1,195 .992 45.4 .836 .571 40.6 
Asia 7,434 7,821 51.3 2,541 2,926 53.5 3,601 3,413 48.7 
Europe 10,189 11,176 52.3 4,198 4,828 53.5 3,481 3,415 49.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 6,973 6,993 50.1 3,791 3,528 48.2 1,756 1,928 52.3 
 1990 
All countries 20,751 21,245 50.6 9,975 10,626 51.6 6,691 5,854 46.7 
Developed countries  8,566 9,640 52.9 3,726 4,373 54.0 2,962 2,807 48.7 
Developing countries 11,594 11,011 48.7 5,920 5,910 50.0 3,589 2,924 44.9 
From Selected region          
Africa 1,715 1,199 41.1 1,016 .744 42.3 .474 .268 36.1 
Asia 4,754 4,680 49.6 1,906 2,073 52.1 2,070 1,716 45.3 
Europe 9,357 10,136 52.0 4,616 5,290 53.4 2,591 2,299 47.0 
Latin America and Caribbean 3,456 3,563 50.8 1,873 1,871 50.0 .967 .958 49.8 
Note: Migrants are defined as persons aged 25 or older. Low-skilled = persons with less than secondary diploma, high-skilled= persons with tertiary diploma. “Total” corresponds to 
the sum of low-skilled, medium and high-skilled migrants. “All countries” refers to the sum of migrants from developed countries, developing countries, dependent territories and 
migrants who did not report their country of birth. Developing and developed country- groups are based on the World Bank income classification. 
Source: Authors’ computations based DLM dataset (2009). 
2.2- Case of African medical brain drain 
The brain drain measures that we have just illustrated may not entirely capture the emigration rates in 
some specific occupations, e.g. IT specialists, teachers, and health professionals. One of the major 
concerns for Africa is the loss of personnel in the health sector. Thanks to recent data sets (for example, 
Clemens and Pettersson (2006); OECD (2007)
6
 we are now able to assess how serious the African medical 
brain drain is. Table 4 uses OECD data to account for the number of physicians and nurses born in the top 
twenty-five African sending countries who migrated to the OECD area. Large countries, e.g. Algeria, 
South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria, are among the top sending countries of medical doctors. 
Small countries, e.g. Mozambique, Angola, and Sierra Leone, are the most affected in relative terms, i.e. 
as a proportion of the total number of physicians working in the origin countries. The same table shows 
that nurses’ emigration rates are above 30% for six African countries. 
The migration of health professionals represents a plague for African countries as health indicators are 
poor, the mortality rate is high, and shortages are particularly severe in the medical sector. The World 
Health Organization’s -hereafter WHO - (2009) statistics reveal that in twenty-seven African countries the 
physicians’ density (i.e. the number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants) does not exceed 2%. According 
to WHO (2006), due to critical shortages in health workers, thirty-six out of the forty-three Sub-Saharan 
African countries face serious difficulties in providing their population with essential health services and 
are unlikely to meet the millennium health development goals.  
According to the same source, the correction of this deficit would require a significant increase in the 
health personnel (+139%). Other studies confirm the critical need for more health workers in Africa. For 
example, Chen et al. (2004) estimated that one million extra health workers would be required for Sub-
Saharan Africa to reach the millennium development goals by 2015. Furthermore, Kurowski et al. (2003) 
argue that “in the best case scenario for 2015 the supply of health workers would reach only 60% of the 
estimated need in the United Republic of Tanzania and the need would be 300% greater than the available 
supply in Chad”. 
                                                          
6 For further information, see OECD (2007, 2008). 
Table 4- Emigration of health professionals. Descriptive statistics by country groups and sex. 
Physicians 
 
Nurses 
 
Country of origin 
Absolute 
values Country of origin 
Emigration 
Rate Country of origin 
Absolute 
values  Country of origin 
Emigration 
rate 
Algeria 10,793 Mozambique 64.5 Nigeria 13,398 
 
Liberia 66.9 
South Africa 7,355 Angola 63.2 Algeria 8,796 
 
Sierra Leone 56.3 
Egypt 7,243 Sierra Leone 58.4 South Africa 6,016 
 
Mauritius 50.4 
Morocco 6,221 Tanzania 55.3 Morocco 5,730 
 
Cap Verde 38.9 
Nigeria 4,611 Liberia 54.2 Ghana 5,230 
 
Sao Tomé & Principe 35.0 
Tunisia 2,415 Guinea-Bissau 49.2 Mauritius 4,502 
 
Equatorial Guinea 31.0 
Kenya 2,385 Sao Tomé & Principe 46.7 Zimbabwe 3,619 
 
Zimbabwe 27.9 
Angola 1,512 Senegal 43.0 Kenya 2,523 
 
Ghana 24.9 
Ghana 1,469 Cape Verde 41.7 Sierra Leone 2,057 
 
Madagascar 24.4 
Uganda 1,084 Congo 41.6 Angola 1,703 
 
Morocco 20.5 
Tanzania 1,018 Benin 40.9 Ethiopia 1,421 
 
Seychelles 19.2 
Mozambique 935 Togo 40.5 Cameroon 1,338 
 
Eritrea 18.8 
Madagascar 889 Malawi 37.9 Liberia 1,240 
 
Guinea-Bissau 18.0 
Zimbabwe 828 Mauritius 35.7 Uganda 1,210 
 
Mozambique 16.5 
Sudan 778 Kenya 34.6 Madagascar 1,157 
 
Somalia 14.4 
Mauritius 725 Equatorial Guinea 33.8 Egypt 1,128 
 
Algeria 12.4 
Ethiopia 633 Somalia 33.3 Tanzania 970 
 
Congo 12.3 
Libya 592 Uganda 32.9 Zambia 820 
 
Comoros 11.7 
Cameroon 572 Eritrea 32.6 Mozambique 779 
 
Angola 11.5 
Zambia 567 Ghana 31.2 Eritrea 548 
 
Nigeria 9.5 
Congo 539 Zambia 31.0 Congo 452 
 
Ethiopia 9.1 
Senegal 449 Zimbabwe 28.4 Tunisia 410 
 
Senegal 8.9 
Congo Dem. Rep.  350 Morocco 28.0 Congo Dem. Rep. 404 
 
Central African Rep. 8.4 
Côte d'Ivoire 261 Burundi 26.2 Côte d'Ivoire 337 
 
Uganda 7.4 
Sierra Leone 236 Ethiopia 24.6 Cap Verde 261 
 
Tanzania 6.8 
Source: Authors’ computations based on the OECD dataset (2007) 
3- Impact of the brain drain on source countries 
One of the major concerns regarding the emigration of the highly educated labor force from Africa is the 
potential loss of the investment directly associated with training. Nowadays, these fears are widespread, 
not only among scholars, but also among policy makers and international and regional development 
agencies. For example, the WHO General Director considered that “countries need their skilled workforce 
to stay so that their professional expertise can benefit the population. When health workers leave to work 
elsewhere, there is a loss of hope and a loss of years of investment”7.  
No comprehensive data documenting the amount of the training costs of skilled African migrants exist. 
However, different sources suggest that those costs might be substantial. For example, the UNCTAD has 
estimated that each African professional migrant represents, on average, a loss of 184,000 US dollars to 
Africa, see, among others, Oyowe (1996); Pang, Lansang, and Haines (2002); Eastwood et al. (2005); 
Kirigia et al. (2006); Mugimu (2010). Despite the fact that this estimate is widely cited, we should keep in 
mind that it has not been updated in more than fifteen years. Consequently, it should be considered as an 
approximation. 
A number of case studies quantify the losses for African countries associated with the migration of the 
highly skilled. For example, the financial cost due to the migration of 600 South African medical 
graduates to New Zealand was estimated at 37 million US dollars, Mugimu (2010). The total cost of 
education from primary to university of a non-specialist medical doctor in Malawi was estimated at 
56,947 US dollars, Muula and Panulo (2007) and 65,997 US dollars for Kenya
8
, Kirigia et al. (2006). In 
2004, Ghana alone lost approximately £35 million spent on training of health professionals who left the 
country for the UK. In contrast, the recruitment of Ghanaian doctors resulted in approximately £65 million 
of savings in training costs in the UK between 1998 and 2002, Mills et al. (2008). From the point of view 
of the receiving countries, Saraladevi et al. (2009) note that in the United Kingdom, “each qualifying 
doctor costs £200,000– £250,000 and 5–6 years to train, so in economic terms, every doctor arriving in the 
United Kingdom is appropriating human capital at zero cost for the use of the UK health services and the 
effect is immediate rather than in 5 years’ time” (p. 62).  
In addition to the waste of resources invested in education, the early literature on the brain drain supports 
the view that skilled migration has several negative effects on the source countries, see, among others, 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974); Kwok and Leland (1982). There are four main messages delivered by the 
traditional literature: (i) the brain drain deprives developing countries of one of their scarcest resources, 
                                                          
7 World Health Organization (2006). 
8 In comparison to gross national income per capita (GNI) these figures represent a huge investment. In 2008, the GNI per capita is estimated at 
US$280 for Malawi and US$730 for Kenya (World Bank, 2010). 
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i.e. human capital; (ii) skilled migrants are net fiscal contributors and their departure represents a fiscal 
loss for their home countries; (iii) human capital is a source of economic growth and the brain drain 
negatively affects the countries’ economic performance and growth prospect; and (iv) the decrease in 
human capital seriously affects the countries capacity for innovation and the adoption of modern 
technologies and increases inequality at the international level, with rich countries becoming richer at the 
expenses of the poor countries.  
More recent literature mitigates the above pessimistic view by putting forward several potential 
compensatory effects of the brain drain. The channels through which these effects may take place are 
different. For example, return migration can be a beneficial route if returning migrants use the additional 
knowledge acquired abroad to start up new entrepreneurial activities and contribute to the diffusion of new 
technology, Stark et al. (1997); Gubert and Nordman (2008); Wahba and Zenou (2009). Other scholars 
argue that highly skilled migrants promote bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) between 
countries of origin and destination through the creation of business networks (see Harris and Schmitt 
(2003) for a survey and Blanes (2005) for a case study focusing on Spain). Furthermore, Wahba and 
Zenou (2009) found that Egyptian return migrants are more likely to become entrepreneurs than non-
migrants. Gubert and Nordman (2008) reached similar conclusions for return migrants to the Maghreb.  
Moreover, remittances can help poverty reduction. Studies conducted focusing on African countries show 
that remittances can favor the development of the source country, Adams et al. (2009). Other studies have 
documented a beneficial effect of remittances on education and poverty reduction, see, for example, Sasin, 
(2008); Herrera et al. (2008); Roushdy et al. (2009). However, Faini (2007) argues that as skilled migrants 
come, in general, from wealthy families
9
 their propensity to remit is relatively lower. Consequently, the 
negative impact of the brain drain on source countries might not be mitigated by the favorable effect of 
remittances.  
Another important strand of literature, that Faini (2003) labeled the “revisionist” approach to the analysis 
of the brain drain, has put forward the concept of brain gain as a potential beneficial effect of highly 
skilled migration. For example, Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997), Vidal (1998), and Beine et al. 
(2001, 2008) argue that if returns to education are higher abroad than at home, the prospects of migration 
might increase the expected return of human capital, thereby stimulating human capital formation among 
residents in source countries. As long as only a fraction of the increased highly skilled labor force end up 
                                                          
9 Inequality of educational opportunities in developing countries is well documented. For example, UNESCO (2009) maintains that “being born 
into the poorest 20% of the wealth distribution in sub-Saharan Africa, or in South and West Asia, more than halves the chance of school 
attendance at grade 9. These income-based disparities are mirrored in differences in average years of education attained by the people aged 17 to 
22. In Mozambique, someone in the poorest 20% has on average 1.9 years of education, compared to 5 years for someone from the richest 20%. In 
Peru, the gap between rich and poor is 4.6 years of schooling, rising to 6.7 years in India”. 
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migrating (due to migration uncertainty), the source country’s long run stock of human capital might be 
higher than what it would have been without migration opportunities. When the incentive effect described 
above (the brain gain) dominates the observed brain drain effect, we can talk about a net brain gain for the 
source country. Beine et al. (2008) found that there are countries which benefit from the brain drain, “the 
winners”, in the authors’ terminology, and countries which experience a net loss of human capital, “the 
losers.” However, the latter are a larger number than the former and their losses are higher than the gains 
of the winners. Net gains are obtained in large countries which combine low levels of human capital and 
low high-skilled emigration rates, while among the losers there are many small African countries 
characterized by low per-capita income (strong financial constraints to education) and high rates of skilled 
migration. 
Other studies focusing on the impact of migration of health personnel found that the medical brain drain 
has a detrimental effect on public health, measured as the rate of adult death and infant child mortality, for 
example, Bhargava et al. (2011). The evidence for the possible existence of a medical brain gain is mixed. 
Chojnicki and Oden-Defoort (2010) found that there might be a brain gain for most African countries, 
given the positive impact of the medical brain drain on the number of graduates from medical schools. 
However, Bhargava et al. (2011) argue that the effect is likely to be too small to compensate for the losses 
caused by the migration of highly skilled medical professionals. It would then be important, from the 
policy perspective, that those African countries which are hit the hardest by the medical brain drain 
phenomenon try and implement policies that mitigate the bad economic conditions for physicians, which 
represent the main causes of their emigration, see Clemens and Pettersson (2006). 
We should keep in mind that the conclusion emerging from these empirical studies should be interpreted 
with caution, as their results may differ according to the methodology and data use. For example, Beine et 
al. (2001) found a positive net gain for developing countries as a whole (+2.2% of tertiary graduates), 
however Docquier et al. (2008) conclusion is more pessimistic: the number of “winners” is very limited 
and, more significantly, the brain drain induces a negative effect on the total number of the tertiary 
educated in developing countries (-2.7% of tertiary graduates).  
It is worth noticing that the theoretical and applied works on the brain gain may suffer from different 
shortcomings. First of all, there is a fundamental argumentation flaw: brain gain research tends to refer 
always to developing countries, highlighting how the brain drain may raise the stock of human capital in 
the source countries. However, there is surprisingly no support for this idea when it comes to high-skilled 
emigration from developed countries. On the contrary, the prevailing perspective remains the one of 
interpreting the emigration of highly skilled people from Europe as a negative phenomenon. The best 
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illustration can be found in the Third European Report on Science and Technology in which the European 
commission (2003) emphasizes:  
“It is common to present the emigration of European students and researchers as a threat 
to Europe’s competitiveness in scientific fields and applied research. The exodus of 
highly qualified scientists and engineers, often described as “brain drain”, may weaken 
the field of research in Europe, while strengthening the continent’s main competitor, the 
US”, p. 225. 
In same report, the European commission points out: 
 “The loss of human resources to the US may put a strain on national education systems 
and place EU employers in a position where there is severe competition with their US 
counterparts for S&T personnel. A more serious consequence could be that the drain of 
EU based talent and skills leads to a further relative strengthening and growth of 
knowledge-intensive industries in the US”, p. 222.   
If the brain gain is a general theory, it should lead to the same conclusions regardless the countries of 
origin to which it applies. 
More importantly, we should also take into consideration that the analysis of brain gain may suffer from 
different shortcomings. First of all, the emigration rate should be ideally, calculated as a ratio of the 
emigrant to the origin countries’ native population. However, because the datasets the authors use do not 
contain information on the structure of immigration in the origin country by educational level, the 
computation of the emigration rate is based on total resident population (natives + immigrants) instead of 
native population. As a consequence, the magnitude of the brain drain might be underestimated, to a large 
extent, for countries where immigrants represent a significant proportion of the resident population
10
.  
An additional key issue concerning the OECD immigration countries is that the brain gain empirical 
literature underestimates the magnitude of brain drain for many countries that send a large proportion of 
their emigrants to non-OECD destinations. According to the United Nations data, the OECD hosts 47% of 
international migrants and available estimates reveal that South- South migration is almost as large as 
South-North. Ratha and Shaw (2007) point out that 40 % of migrants from developing countries live in the 
                                                          
10 According to the United Nations data, the percentage of the migrant population exceeds 65% of the resident population in Qatar (76%), United 
Arab Emirates (71%), and Kuwait (67%). In other countries, international migrants represent a significant proportion of the resident population, 
for example, Jordan (40%), Bahrain (37%), Brunei (31%), Saudi Arabia (25%), Antigua and Barbuda (21%), Gabon (17%), and Lebanon (18%). 
The data refers to 2000, the same year used in the Beine and al. (2008) empirical analysis.                    
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OECD high-income countries, against 47 % in other developing countries. Focusing on Africa, this study 
found that more than two out every three (69 %) African international migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa 
migrate to developing countries 
The above considerations suggest that by neglecting migration to non-OECD countries, the empirical 
work aiming at verifying the brain gain theory underestimates, to a large extent, the magnitude of skilled 
emigration, especially from developing countries. A new dataset developed by Docquier, Marfouk, Özden 
and Parsons (2011) - DMOP henceforth - provides information on the structure of immigration to OECD 
and non-OECD countries by origin, educational level, and gender for 1990 and 2000
11
. By adding the 
migration flows to seven African countries
12
, the number of African high-skilled emigrants increases by 
nearly 131,000 persons (9%) in 2000, and rose to approximately 361,000 or 26% to all the forty-six non-
OECD countries. Figure 2 uses DMOP and DLM07 in order to compare the emigration rates computed 
using the resident (DLM07) vs. the native population (DMOP). 
As expected, Figure 2 shows that using the resident population instead of the native population will result 
in the underestimation of high-skilled emigration rates. 
Figure 2 – Comparison of high-skilled emigration rates computed with respect to the resident (DLM07) or the 
native population (DMOP) to the OECD area for selected origin countries in 2000. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DLM (2009) and DMOP (2011) datasets. 
                                                          
11 In 2000, seventy-six receiving countries were considered (thirty OECD countries and forty-six non-OECD countries). In Docquier, Lowell and 
Marfouk dataset, Israel, Chile, Estonia, and Slovenia, who became OECD members in 2010, are included. To allow a comparison between high-
skilled workers’ emigration rates in DLM dataset used in the empirical works on brain gain theory and the extended database, these countries are 
included in the non-OECD group.  
12 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, South Africa, 
and Uganda. 
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In these circumstances it is not surprising that, for these nations, the brain gain could dominate the brain 
drain effect and thus their inclusion in the group of the “winners”. The real surprise is that none of the 
ardent defenders of the brain gain theory have addressed this major issue so far. 
In Figure 3 we use DMOP to compare the highly skilled emigration rates when also emigration to non-
OECD countries is taken into account. The figure clearly indicates that the brain drain is largely 
underestimated in many Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Niger, and Mali. For example, for Lesotho, high-skilled emigration rate to the OECD and non-
OECD countries (23%) is approximately six times higher than the high-skilled emigration rate to the 
OECD countries (4%). The figure also shows that the magnitude of the brain drain is also underestimated 
for non-African countries. Our estimates should be considered as a lower-bound measure of high-skilled 
emigration. In fact, DMOP only considers seventy-six receiving countries
13
. Due to the low quality of the 
data, the information on sending countries is partial. In many cases only a few sending countries can be 
distinguished
14
. The other countries are aggregated and considered as residual in the entry “other 
countries” or “unknown.” 
Figure 3 – Comparison of the emigration rates of high-skilled workers to the OECD and non-OECD versus 
OECD, for selected origin countries in 2000. 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on DLM (2009) and DMOP (2011) datasets. 
                                                          
13 Among them there are seven African countries, which represent only a fraction of the total stock of international migrants living in Africa. 
14 In many cases only a very limited number of origin countries could be identified, e.g. Uganda (9), Rwanda (8), and Kenya (5). 
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These elements reveal that additional work is needed before a definitive conclusion can be drawn on the 
effect of skilled migration on human capital formation in developing countries in general, and Africa in 
particular. Indeed, several strands of migration literature put forward different, sometimes opposite, 
hypothesis on this issue, which suggests that there might be scope for further analysis aimed at shading 
some more light on what is still not clear and it is still the object of a vivid debate.  
4- What do we need to know? 
Research on the brain drain from developing countries in general, and from Africa in particular, has a long 
history, however significant effort is still needed to shed more light on a few largely unexplored 
dimensions of skilled migration from Africa. Until now research on the brain gain has been gender 
blinded. Consequently, we have no idea about the impact of skilled female migration on human capital 
formation. Such an extension would be extremely relevant if applied to African countries. Probably, the 
lack of adequate data and the relatively limited interest in female migration can be considered responsible 
for the low attention that the female brain drain from Africa has received, thus far. However, some 
progress in terms of data collection has recently been made. In fact, a few original datasets, Dumont et al. 
(2007); Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2007, 2009); Dumont, Spielvogel, and Widmaier (2010); 
Docquier, Marfouk, Parsons, and Özden (2011) have become available, which contain detailed 
information on international migration by gender, educational attainment, countries of origin, and 
destination. We have documented and used some of the above datasets in order to show the magnitude of 
female brain drain, and we hope that these new data will stimulate further research on female migration. 
For example, the latest year to which the above dataset refer is 2000. Widening the time frame of 
migration data by gender would represent a considerable improvement and open up several opportunities 
for the analysis of migration dynamics. 
A second topic of crucial relevance is the analysis of the brain drain from different key sectors in Africa. 
Many scholars underlined that scarce and inadequate data on this topic pose major obstacles in studying 
the dynamics of migration from developing countries. For example, Sako (2002) points out that “there is 
no systematic record of the number of skilled professionals that Africa has lost to the developed world”. 
More recently, the European University Association (2010) stated that “both in Africa and Europe there 
still seems to be a lack of awareness of the extent of brain drain and its impact at all levels, from academic 
to societal and economic” (p.14). So far, the magnitude of international migration of different highly 
skilled professionals, e.g. academic professionals
15
, engineers, entrepreneurs, teachers, and IT specialists 
                                                          
15 Case studies reveal that academic professionals’ brain drain is a source of concern in African countries. For example, Hatungimana (2007) 
reported that the University of Burundi has lost a significant proportion of its qualified staff during the last years. In January 2007, only 169 full-
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is still unknown. This means that an important piece of international mobility of skilled Africans is still 
missing. Hence, effort in terms of data collection would help policy makers to control and monitor their 
losses of highly skilled workers. Furthermore, the migration of highly skilled workers represents a loss of 
human capital not only for the origin countries themselves, but it may result in a double loss of human 
capital, if, due to job mismatch in the destination country labor market, those highly skilled migrants end 
up in jobs that require a lower level of education.
16
 The existence of this kind of brain waste has been 
documented in different studies, e.g. Chiswick and Miller (2010); Mattoo et al. (2008); Özden (2006), and 
it makes it even a more compelling case for a greater data collection effort on international migration from 
the developing world by sectors of occupations. 
Nowadays, a number of immigration countries in the OECD area are thinking about reforms of their 
immigration policies. Besides controlling its overall volume, a common point of contemporary migration 
policies is their selective nature in terms of the education of migrants. For example, the skill-based points 
systems in Australia, Canada and New Zealand target candidates to emigration according to their 
prospective contribution to the economy. In the United States emphasis is put on the selection of highly 
skilled workers through a system of quotas favouring candidates with academic degrees and/or specific 
professional skills. Recently, a number of European countries (including France, Germany, Ireland and the 
UK) have introduced programs aiming at attracting the qualified labor force. In May 2009, the European 
Council has agreed on the proposed European Union (UE) “blue card”, which aims at attracting highly-
skilled migrants from non-EU countries. 
There is no doubt that the shift in immigration policies of the OECD countries towards selective 
immigration systems may intensify the African brain drain. However, a comprehensive analysis of the 
main driving forces behind brain drain from Africa in general and the impact of adoption of more selective 
immigration policies in particular flows of skilled workers from the continent is needed. Such an analysis 
would help understand migration dynamics form Africa and provide valuable insights to policy-makers in 
countries of origin to better control and monitor their losses of highly skilled workers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
time lecturers’ doctorate holders of the 319 that the University should normally count were employed. The situation is more dramatic in the 
Faculty of Medicine: “In 1985-1986, the Faculty had 39 medical professors. Today it has barely 14 qualified lecturers, with some major 
departments having no tenured lecturers at all”. 
16 Özden (2006), for example, shows that in the US only small fraction  (25%) of foreign-born  males from  Morocco who obtained their Bachelor 
degree from  their home countries have a skilled job and  this proportion does not exceed  40% for many developing countries: Ethiopia (37%), 
Egypt (38%), Ghana (40%), Nigeria (40%), while it is much higher for migrants coming from other countries (e.g. 64%  Canada, 65%  United 
Kingdom, 67%  Australia, and  76% India). 
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5- Conclusions 
Nowadays, emigration from Africa is increasingly a question of mobility of highly-skilled persons. During 
the period 1990-2000, the number of high-skilled African-born workers in the OECD grew by 90%. As a 
consequence of this large outflow of highly educated individuals, a number of African countries 
experienced a considerable brain drain. However, while there appears to be deep and growing concern for 
the exodus of high-skilled Africans, little research, to date, has been done to establish the impact of skilled 
migration on source countries. This is mainly due to the poor quantity and bad quality of international 
migration data.  
Using different datasets that have recently become available, this paper has shown that: (i) a number of 
African countries experienced a considerable brain drain; (ii) the migration of health professionals 
represents a plague for African countries and its potential impact on public health are worrying; and (iii) 
women represent a major component of skilled migration for Africa, and female migration should, 
accordingly, receive more attention from economic and policy research. This last point would be 
especially interesting for African policy makers who aim to involve the national population living abroad 
in the country of origin’s process of development. 
We have also documented the possible main effects of the African brain drain on source countries. In 
addition to the losses of public resources spent on the education of individuals who end up living outside 
the country, a number of observers consider that by depriving African countries of one of their scarcest 
resources, i.e. human capital, the brain drain can negatively affect the continent’s economic performance 
and growth prospects. Yet, a recent wave of theoretical and empirical studies highlighted how a limited 
but positive high-skilled emigration rate can be beneficial for the sending countries. The channels through 
which this is possible are several, ranging from return migration and additional skills acquired abroad, 
flows of remittances, tourism revenues, technology transfers, creation of business and trade networks, and 
the stimulation of human capital formation at home. However, understanding and measuring the effect of 
the brain drain on African countries requires further empirical research and additional efforts in terms of 
data collection. This would allow drawing clearer conclusions on the effect of skilled migration on human 
capital formation in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. 
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